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Proceedings of the Annual Acquisition Research Program 
The following article is taken as an excerpt from the proceedings of the annual 
Acquisition Research Program.  This annual event showcases the research projects 
funded through the Acquisition Research Program at the Graduate School of Business 
and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Featuring keynote speakers, 
plenary panels, multiple panel sessions, a student research poster show and social 
events, the Annual Acquisition Research Symposium offers a candid environment 
where high-ranking Department of Defense (DoD) officials, industry officials, 
accomplished faculty and military students are encouraged to collaborate on finding 
applicable solutions to the challenges facing acquisition policies and processes within 
the DoD today.  By jointly and publicly questioning the norms of industry and academia, 
the resulting research benefits from myriad perspectives and collaborations which can 
identify better solutions and practices in acquisition, contract, financial, logistics and 
program management. 
For further information regarding the Acquisition Research Program, electronic 
copies of additional research, or to learn more about becoming a sponsor, please visit 
our program website at: 
www.acquistionresearch.org  
For further information on or to register for the next Acquisition Research 
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executed.  Our analysis has determined that there are at least three primary barriers to 
successful implementation of strategic purchasing in DoD acquisition. First, products or services 
that may be easily “commoditized” by industry are subject to many more constraints which limit 
or obviate the ability for the Government to leverage its spend.  Second, the additional 
regulations and statutes which the DoD must comply with (such as the Buy American Act, 
Davis-Bacon, and Small Business Rules) limit the opportunities to pursue leveraged buying. 
Third, there is no single voice responsible for the organization spend, or with the ability to 
dictate and enforce strategic acquisition programs. This paper offers potential solutions for each 
of these challenges. 
Introduction 
One can argue the Department of Defense has always faced a fiscal crisis. Year after 
year, the DoD engages in a “guns versus butter debate” in competing with other agencies for 
the defense slice of the budget.  The debating then shifts to the internal grappling between the 
services fighting for their parochial piece of the pie.  Simply put, there has never been enough to 
go around.  Subsequently, policymakers have always had to make tough budget decisions.  
Throughout the 90’s following the end of the Cold War, defense budgets were in a steady 
decline.  Between 1990 and 1997 outlays dropped nearly 26% in real terms (OSD, 2007).  
Between 1984 and 1998, the defense budget authority declined in real, inflation-adjusted 
dollars.  Over the last five years, the budget shows what appears to be a slight increase in 
defense outlays, but these increases have included increased costs for the Global War on 
Terrorism, the requirements for maintaining a heightened vigilance, and requirements levied in 
support of homeland security.  In fact, between September 11, 2001 to May 2005, the DoD 
spent approximately $190B in support of these efforts.   
To further compound the problem, upward pressures on defense spending are 
substantial.  First, the DoD faces pressures to modernize and recapitalize many of its weapon 
systems.  The Department went through a “draw down” following the Cold War and achieved 
mandated reductions in defense spending primarily through reductions in its procuring activity.  
The Department sacrificed acquisitions to free funds for operational readiness.  As a result, 
many of its current weapons systems are nearing the end of their useful life and will soon 
require replacement.  Secondly, the DoD has continuing “must pay” obligations.  These include 
health care costs for retirees, active duty troops and their families, and rising personnel costs.  
The fact of the matter is that it costs more to maintain a military force each year; in fact, most 
defense costs rise faster than inflation.  Nevertheless, budget cuts continue.  In January 2005, 
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz issued Program Budget Decision 753.  The 
decision identified $30 billion of additional cuts in planned defense spending through 2011.  In 
March 2005, then Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. John P. Jumper predicted a $3 billion shortfall in 
FY2005 operations and maintenance funds (Byron, 2004).  There are simply too few dollars 
available to support current military operations, modernization efforts, and “must pay” bills.   
Naturally, within such a fiscally constrained environment, the focus of criticism shifts 
inwards towards an agency’s business practices.  When faced with enormous fiscal pressures 
and a growing budget deficit, agencies focus on revamping business processes to get the most 
out of every dollar spent. “For nearly four decades, Congress, the media and the White House 
have figuratively and literally hammered the Department of Defense (DoD) and the military 
services for waste and inefficiencies in buying” (Gottlieb, 2004).  The message hasn’t fallen on 
deaf ears.  For years the Department of Defense has recognized cost inefficiencies in its 
acquisition and procurement practices.  In fact, regulations to control defense procurements 
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the first formal unified defense procurement policy to be established (Gates, 1989; Gansler, 
1989).  Early procurement reform efforts in the DoD focused on coordinating procurement 
reform among the services. The various services’ missions were ambiguous, inter-service 
competition was high, and in a number of areas procurement programs overlapped (Acker, 
1980; Gates, 1989).  Over the last 30 years, there have been over 20 major regulatory and 
administrative initiatives implemented by Congress and the DoD that were intended to improve 
cost inefficiencies in defense procurement processes.  In 2001, the Office of Management and 
Budget presented to congress the President’s Management Agenda which delineated a strategy 
for improving the management and performance of the federal government. The plan concluded 
the need for reform as urgent.  
As a follow-up effort, the GAO assessed the President’s Management Agenda in an April 
2005 testimony to the US Senate.  They found a continuing need for broad-based 
transformations to address major economy, efficiency, and effectiveness challenges in a 
number of the government’s business process.  DoD business processes need to change in 
order to more effectively deliver warfighting capabilities, address growing pressures on 
resources, and benefit from economies of scale.  Procurement transformation is nothing new.   
The Air Force’s commodity council initiative represents one of the more recent and 
promising strategic purchasing efforts. Fundamentally speaking, the general premise of a 
commodities council rests on developing strategies to maximize value by leveraging an 
organization’s buying power in a given commodities sector.  According to Mr. Charlie Williams, 
the Air Force’s Deputy Assistant Secretary for Contracting, “despite the huge buying power our 
Air Force dollars should have, we are missing opportunities to leverage our dollars by relying 
heavily upon local strategies and execution to fulfill individual unit requirements” (Karas, 2004).  
Recognizing the potential of a proven industry practice, the Air Force established its first council 
in June 2003 focusing on Information Technology products.  To date, the IT Commodity Council 
reports savings of approximately $34 million.  In 2004, the AF stood up additional councils 
targeting force protection and medical services.  Unfortunately, these councils are in the early 
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The overall goal of this paper is to provide the DoD with an understanding of differences 
between DoD and private procurement activities and to demonstrate that strategic purchasing 
efforts in the DoD may not achieve the same gains or benefits realized by those in the private 
sector.   There are several barriers to successfully implementing strategic purchasing methods 
within DoD acquisitions.  These barriers may obviate or negate the potential of one of industry’s 
most promising procurement practices.  While strategic purchasing in the DoD certainly appears 
promising, policymakers need to understand the difference between private and public 
commodity councils lest their expectations become unsupported and unreasonably optimistic.  
Unrealized expectations could jeopardize other valid and necessary transformation efforts, 
could foster a lack of faith in benchmarking proven industry practices, and could lead to a loss of 
confidence and support from the taxpayer.  A key component of the federal acquisition system, 
in part, is to deliver “the best value product or service to the customer, while maintaining the 
public’s trust.”  Also, policy makers need to understand these differences in conducting cost-
benefit analysis on strategic purchasing initiatives. They may find the rewards unable to justify 
the costs of their business efforts.  
Industry’s Approach 
In their struggles to remain profitable, commercial organizations face similar fiscal 
pressures and dynamics.  Market dynamics, competing firms, consumers and stockholders 
drive organizations towards efficiency and profitability.  Cost control in the commercial 
marketplace is a fundamental business practice.  With that in mind, purchasing costs can 
represent a relatively substantial percentage of an organization’s total operating costs.  In some 
cases, the purchases of outside goods and services can consume as much as 60% or more of a 
business’ revenues.  For example, at Hewlitt-Packard, 70% of revenues are used to buy 
materials for production (Carborne, 2004).  At IBM, the budget for purchasing is over 50% of the 
company’s annual revenue (Carborne, 1999).  Gabbard (2004) found outside materials and 
services accounted for almost 70% of average corporate expenditures.  Consequently, modest 
reductions in purchasing costs can yield substantial rewards—all which contribute to the bottom 
line.   
As a result, over the last 30 to 40 years, leaders have been paying increasing attention 
to the procurement process and its relationship to profitability.  The increased attention to 
purchasing has led to a dramatic shift in how organizations buy goods and services.  
Researchers show the procurement process has evolved over the years from what was once a 
tactical and clerical function to what is now a more strategic endeavor (Rendon, 2005).  A series 
of external events shaped the context.  An oil embargo and basic raw material shortages in the 
1970’s, an interest rate spike and manufacturing crisis in the 1980’s and a slowly growing 
demand coupled with rising overhead costs and weak pricing power in the 1990’s pushed the 
purchasing department to the forefront.  Porter describes these series of structural, economic 
and business shifts, along with global competition and flat revenues as strengthening the 
argument for total corporate spend control (Porter, 2003).     
In desperate attempts to retain profitability, corporate leaders emphasized cost cutting 
and turned to the purchasing functions to make it happen (Staff, 2002).  In a 2002 survey, over 
90% of procurement professionals stated they were directed to help reduce their company’s 
costs and that pressures to do so have escalated over the preceding 5 years (Staff, 2002).  This 
same survey found the overall cost-reduction goal for manufacturing companies averaging 12% 
(Staff, 2002).  The 90’s became the decade of change as businesses widely recognized the 
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competitiveness.  In order to gain a competitive edge in the marketplace, procurement leaders 
had to develop a strategic orientation to the procurement process (Rendon, 2005).  Within this 
framework, procurement professionals developed the procurement approach collectively 
referred to as strategic sourcing. 
Strategic Sourcing 
Organizations saw the potential of realizing significant cost reductions and other value-
added outputs using strategic sourcing principles.  Previous purchasing techniques were more 
tactical and focused more on independent, localized “wins.”  Strategic sourcing takes a broader 
view of a purchase within the context of the entire organization and examines the potential 
broader, longer-term gains.  “It involves taking a more strategic approach to the selection of 
suppliers—an approach that is more aligned with the organization’s competitive strategy 
(Rendon, 2005).  Newhart (2006) defines it as “a logical and systematic process for managing 
and prioritizing an organization’s spend.”  The US government’s definition strikes a similar 
chord.  According to the Office of Management and Budget (2005), strategic sourcing is the 
“collaborative and structured process of critically analyzing spending and using this information 
to make business decisions about acquiring commodities and services more effectively and 
efficiently.”  Overall, the strategy is fundamentally about getting more for your dollar—certainly a 
reasonable response when operating within a fiscally constrained environment.   Commercial 
procurement leaders use strategic sourcing tools to reduce costs and increase operating 
efficiencies (Sullivan, 2006).  Regardless of which definition one clings to, the essence of 
strategic sourcing centers on two fundamental precepts: 1) spend analysis, and 2) leveraging.   
Spend analysis involves a collaborative and structured process for critically analyzing an 
organization’s spending data.  “It is the process of aggregating, cleansing, and analyzing 
corporate spending data for the purposes of reducing costs and improving operational 
performance” (Gabbard, 2004).  Fundamentally speaking, it requires organizations to identify 
what goods or services are being purchased, who requires them, and who is currently getting 
the money (who are the suppliers) (Heath, 2006).  The principle rests on the understanding that 
purchasers must first understand every element of company spend and then evaluate the 
commodity and how it is being procured.  This investigation includes market research and 
industry analysis.  A thorough understanding of spend data allows an organization to then 
exploit the information by leveraging the organization’s collective buying power in the 
marketplace to obtain the lowest price for goods and services.  Leveraging is a key component 
of strategic sourcing.  It improves an organization’s buying power with contractors and enables it 
to expect value-added outputs such as better quality, responsiveness and service in addition to 
reduced costs (Heath, 2006).  The object of leveraging is to exploit volume, which is the main 
determinant of a company’s overall bargaining power.  Organizations achieve volume and 
leveraging by consolidating contracts and aggregating spend with fewer suppliers (Patton, 2006; 
Gabbard, 2004).  “Leverage or buying power is, by far, the most frequently cited benefit of 
greater purchasing centralization” (Porter, 1999). 
The Path towards Strategic Purchasing in the DoD 
Every purchasing situation is unique.  Consequently, procurement strategies will differ 
depending on a number of internal and external factors.  Internal factors are those that reflect 
the goals of the buying organization such as cost reduction, improved quality, the value of the 
item, etc.  External factors are those market dynamics and other factors that may impact the 
overall effectiveness of the product or service being sourced.  These include things such as the 
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sourcing approach, buyers consider these factors and their influence on the procurement 
approach (Kraljik, 1983).  The purchaser’s task then becomes tailoring a sourcing strategy for a 
specific commodity that best exploits the buying organization’s leverage in a given context.  
Peter Kraljik, a business consultant, developed a comprehensive, contingency-based model to 
assist purchasers in selecting appropriate sourcing strategies based on two variables: (1) the 
strategic importance of purchasing in terms of the value added by the commodity (cost of 
materials, value-added profile, profitability, etc.), and (2) the complexity of the supply market in 
terms of commodity availability, entry barriers, monopoly or oligopoly conditions, pace of 
technological advance, etc. (Figure 1) (Kraljik, 1983).  Viewed through another lens, the first 
variable (importance of purchasing) translates to profit impact.  One can view the second 















Figure 1. Sourcing Strategies (Kraljik, 1983) 
As a commodity group, leverage items typically represent approximately 70% of a 
company’s total expenditures (Gabbard, 2004).  Within this segment, the market has large 
capacity and offers many alternatives and many sources.  Additionally, the confluence of high 
purchasing volume and market availability position the procurement organization in a much 
better negotiating position.  Items in this sector are, therefore, often exploitable and offer higher 
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Strategic items also offer the potential for high payback.  These items are vital to the 
ongoing operations of the company and represent approximately 20% of the dollars expended 
by a company (Gabbard, 2004).  Compared to leverage-item purchases, though, there are 
fewer, large expenditure transactions for these items. Procurement experts characterize this 
segment as one with greater supply risk as there are fewer suppliers available and often 
barriers to entry (Kraljik, 1983).    
Experts frequently categorize the non-critical items sector as a buyer’s market.  These 
items typically only constitute approximately 5% of a company’s spend (Gabbard, 2004).  The 
market offers many options and multiple suppliers, and buyers typically have little brand 
preference.  Profit impact and supply risk for this segment are both low.  The last category, 
bottleneck items, also represents only about 5% of a typical organization’s spend (Gabbard, 
2004).  Supply risk is high as there are typically few sources and options available, and profit 
potential is low.    
Inherent in Kraljik’s model is the premise that there is no “one size fits all” approach to 
procurement.  The purpose of the model is simply to ensure procurement officials integrate and 
align sourcing strategies with the overarching competitive strategy in order to develop an overall 
strategic supply position that balances competitive goals against supply conditions.  With 
upwards of 90% of purchasing offices operating under the corporate direction to cut 
procurement costs, and with cost reduction goals as high as 12% on corporate spend, 
organizations logically placed emphasis on the strategies identified in the upper quadrants—
materials management and supply management.  Sourcing strategies for these categories of 
commodities offer higher profitability profiles than those in the lower quadrants.  Leverage items 
have high profit impact with low supply risk, while strategic items have high profit impact and 
high supply risk.  When a principal goal of an organization is slashing procurement costs, 
focusing on leverage items and strategic items is appropriate.    
“Leverage Items” 
Leverage items offered an attractive starting point for procuring offices anxious to 
smartly reduce procurement costs.  Market capacity is large, as is the potential pay-back.  With 
such a large percentage of corporate costs tied to leverage items, the potential rewards of even 
small percentage gains can be enormous.  For example, in 2004, Hewlitt-Packard spent nearly 
$43B on production materials (Carbone, 2004).  A modest 1-2% cost reduction in purchasing 
costs could yield nearly $1B on the bottom line.  As indicated by the strategy’s focus for 
leverage items, the core task involves exploiting the full purchasing power of the organization to 
increase its bargaining power through leveraging.  “Most procurement experts believe 15-20% 
of purchased materials and services can be saved (billions of dollars in a large company) by 
centralizing procurement and leveraging a far-flung corporation’s buying power” (Richter, 2003). 
Commodity Councils 
Industry developed the commodity council approach to maximize the strategic sourcing 
decision across the spectrum of available strategies.   A commodity council is a cross-functional 
team that develops strategies for individual commodity groups by analyzing spend data, defining 
customer requirements, and conducting market research.  “In developing its strategy, the goal of 
a council is to help maximize the firm’s competitive advantage by extracting the maximum value 
for the commodity from its suppliers” (Ausink, Baldwin, & Paul, 2003).  In other words, councils 
are responsible for meeting the internal customer’s needs at the lowest total cost.  Their 
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discounting, but discounts can also be realized through process efficiencies and reduced 
transaction costs.  The team is typically composed of a variety of experts and key stakeholders 
in the company who work full time on the commodity team.  The most successful teams 
understood the decision as too important to be assigned as an additional duty; therefore, 
members were fully committed to the team (Heath, 2006).  Organizations used commodity 
councils to ensure they had the appropriate knowledge mix, credibility, and technical expertise.   
Between 2002 and 2003, the Government Accountability Office studied procurement 
best practices of eleven companies—each a leader in their respective market.  They found that 
companies adopted a strategic approach to “leverage their buying power, reduce costs, better 
manage their suppliers, and improve the quality of goods and services acquired” (GAO, 2004). 
On average, these 11 companies realized up to 20% in procurement cost savings.  The study 
identified the following four broad principles and best practices for commodity councils: (1) 
Secure up-front commitment from top leaders; (2) Obtain improved knowledge on procurement 
spending; (3) Create supporting structure, processes, and roles; and (4) Enable success 
through sustained leadership, communication, and metrics. (Figure 2) Lasseter identified similar 
steps in his sourcing model.  His “balanced sourcing model” describes a process that ensures 
competitive pricing from suppliers while simultaneously nurturing a cooperative buyer-seller 
relationship.  He suggests the following seven activities as broad guidelines to be used by a 
council when developing a particular commodity strategy: (1) Spend analysis, (2) Industry 
analysis, (3) Cost/performance analysis, (4) Supplier role analysis, (5) Business process 
reintegration, (6) Savings quantification, and (7) Implementation (Lasseter, 1998).  With the 
exception of the savings quantification step in Lasseter’s model, both models address the same 
fundamental best practices. Lasseter suggests savings quantification is one of the more critical 
steps as it lends credibility and support to the proposed strategy and can be used to gain the 
support of upper management.  Although challenging, documenting savings is paramount in 
order to show success in centralized procurement (Stephens, 2005).  By developing a cost-
savings model as part of the sourcing strategy, buyers build a case for taking a consolidated 
approach.  It justifies the actions and allows senior managers to realign resources to more 








Figure 1. GAO Analysis: Industry Best Practices (GAO, 2004) 
Industry’s Success 
Of course, the greatest measure of the potential of an industry practice is in the 
demonstrated results.  Table 1 identifies just a few of the companies who have leveraged their 
corporate spend through centralized procurement and presents the results of their efforts. 
Leading procurement organizations operate, on average, with 46% fewer suppliers than typical 
companies and concentrate 80% of their spend on just 5.9% of their suppliers (Staff, 2005).  
This concentration of spend not only improves an organization’s negotiating leverage but also 
fosters collaborative buyer-seller relationships which can remove non-value added costs and 
identify other areas for improvement.  These two key concepts (consolidating enterprise-wide 
volume and concentrating the supply base) have become industry’s mantra in its strategic 
sourcing initiatives.  




- consolidated requirements of all its divisions and locations 
- established 17 councils’ charter with reducing the number of 
suppliers and reducing costs 
- reduced the number of suppliers from ~4,900 in 1993; now about 
85% of IBM’s $17.1B in production purchases is with 50 suppliers 
- realized pricing discounts 5-10% below industry average 
Hewlitt Packard  
(Carbone, 2004) 
 
- centralized purchasing of key commodities 
- top priority was to leverage their size and scale to cut costs 
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- spend 85% of their procurement dollars with just 35 suppliers 
- realized $1.2B in savings from 2001 to 2004 
Brunswick Corp. 
(Avery, 1999) 
- centralized purchasing of six distinct units 
- set specific cost reduction goals 






- top priority was consolidating their purchases and reducing the 
number of suppliers 
- developed sourcing strategies for ~20 commodities 
- from 2000 to 2002, reduced the number of suppliers from over 3,000 
to less than 1,500 
- spend 80% of their procurement dollars with just 60 suppliers 
- reduced procurement costs up to 55% 




- top priority was consolidating their purchases and reducing the 
number of suppliers 
- developed sourcing strategies for ~20 commodities 
- from 2000 to 20002 reduced the number of suppliers from over 3,000 
to less than 1,500 
- spend 80% of their procurement dollars with just 60 suppliers 
- reduced procurement costs up to 55% 




According to the Office of Management and Budget, the federal government spends 
approximately $300 billion on goods and services each fiscal year.  In FY2004, the DoD 
procured nearly $230 billion in goods and services (OSD, 2007).  The Air Force’s share was 
approximately $55.2B with approximately half of its budget allocated toward purchased goods 
and services.  “A modest 1 percent to 2 percent reduction would produce savings equivalent to 
the annual revenues of a Fortune 500 company” (Sullivan, 2006).  Accordingly, maximizing 
value for taxpayers is an explicit top priority for the DoD and the OMB.   Based on industry’s 
demonstrated successes with commodity councils, it’s no wonder the federal government 
sought to benchmark the practice.  In May 2005, David H. Safavian, Administrator for Federal 
Procurement Policy, said “the use of strategic sourcing is designed to get better pricing when 
the government buys commodity items. Strategic sourcing is just another example of our efforts 
to best leverage the government’s buying power and to realize the most savings for taxpayers” 
(OMB, 2005). Similarly, the top program objective for the DoD’s department-wide strategic 
sourcing program is a reduction in total cost of ownership.  Like industry, the overall purpose of 
DoD strategic purchasing initiatives is to leverage purchasing volume to reduce purchase costs 
and to improve other value-added areas such as better customer support, increased quality, 
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Barriers to Successful Strategic Purchasing Within the DoD 
Industry’s objectives throughout the development of strategic purchasing approaches 
were clear.   Above all, senior managers sought to improve profitability by leveraging corporate 
buying power, and the results validated their decisions to centralize procurement activities.  
While the potential of massive cost savings reductions is extremely attractive to the DoD, 
policymakers must understand the Department is not IBM.  The DoD and other federal agencies 
have unique characteristics which may hinder the successful implementation of private-sector 
strategic purchasing best practices.  These characteristics include having a commodity portfolio 
that may not allow for leveraging opportunities, procurement statutes that counter leverage-
buying principles, an organizational structure that lacks a chief procurement officer vested with 
full responsibility and accountability for procurement spend, and a fragmented and balkanized 
buying arm that hinders synergy and unity of effort.   
The Difficulty Leveraging Services in the DoD 
The DoD spends significant amounts of its annual procurement spend on services.  
“Between 2001 and 2002, DoD’s reported spending for services contracting jumped almost 18 
percent to about $93 billion” (GAO, 2003).  In 2004, the DoD’s spending on services 
approached $100 billion annually (GAO, 2004).  With services now accounting for more than 
half of the DoD’s total annual spend, seeking leverage opportunities is appealing.  Leveraging 
relates to the concept of economies of scale.  Scale economies refer to economic efficiencies 
earned by carrying out a process on a larger and larger scale.  Cost reductions come from the 
ability to distribute non-production costs over a greater number of products.  In other words, as 
volume increases, organizations gain economic efficiencies by diffusing total input costs across 
a broader base.  Ultimately, this decreases the marginal cost of producing the good or service.   
When an organization purchases in bulk, it achieves economies of scale by decreasing the 
average cost of inputs.  Researchers have identified two segments of economies of scale: 
volume and learning (Pearson & Wisner, 1993).  Volume economies of scale refer to the 
definition provided above; namely, increases in production volume allow for lower unit costs.  
Organizations achieve learning economies of scale where improvements or advancements in 
labor and organizational efficiencies or improvements in planning or techniques lead to lower 
total costs and per-unit costs.  People often refer to these gains as learning-curve efficiencies. 
Centralization of labor in large-scale operations gives workers the opportunity to become 
proficient at the specific tasks assigned to them, and specialization further reduces labor 
inefficiencies.  However, geographically distributed services, such as many of those required at 
DoD installations, may not allow for economies of scale because of the dispersion of labor.  In 
fact, dispersion of services may actually increase average cost and result in dis-economies of 
scale.  While this characteristic is not unique to the DoD, what is distinctive is the DoD’s inability 
to replicate the private sector’s response of possibly consolidating operations.  For example, 
even where operational efficiencies are possible, base closings or mergers are controlled by 
Congress—not the DoD.  Figure 3 displays the level of centralized purchasing for services by 
category (Center for Strategic Supply Research, 2002).  Note the trend for the decentralization 
of distributed services.  Whereas complex services (or those requiring retained relationships 
with the procuring organization) are often targets for centralization, non-complex distributed 
services such as food service, landscaping, janitorial, gate guards, waste removal or 
construction are not good candidates for centralization.  These types of services are location-
specific in that contractors must physically perform the services on the requiring installation.  
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majority of total contract costs.  Typically, labor intensive operations are not amenable to 
economies-of-scale influences.  This constraint may further offset potential learning economies 
of scale by inhibiting corporate learning.  Lastly, services such as these are nearly impossible to 
centrally purchase effectively and efficiently because supply markets are highly localized.  
Consequently, they are simply not good candidates for centralized purchasing.  Still, bulk 
purchasing of services could allow for some volume economies of scale by distributing fixed 
























































































































































































































































Figure 2. Centralized Purchasing of Services (Center for Strategic Supply Research, 
2002). 
The Effect of Federal Procurement Statutes on Leveraging Services  
Statues such as the McNamara-O’Hara Service Contract Act (SCA) of 1965 and the 
Davis-Bacon and Related Acts (DBRA) may actually inhibit volume economies of scale with 
respect to leveraging labor costs.  In fiscal year 2003, federal agencies spent over $45B on 
contract services covered by the SCA (GAO, 2005).  The SCA applies to every contract 
“entered into by the United States or the District of Columbia where the principal purpose of the 
contract is to furnish services in the US through the use of ‘service employees’” (Dept of Labor, 
2006). The SCA does not apply to certain types of contractual services, but where applicable, it 
requires contractors and subcontractors performing on contracts in excess of $2,500 to pay 
service employees no less than the wage rates and fringe benefits found prevailing in the 
locality.  The Department of Labor determines the prevailing wage rates and fringe benefits in 
an area by the average of the wages and benefits earned by at least 50% of workers in a given 
service category and issues formal wage determinations which are incorporated into federal 
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Similarly, the DBRA “requires all contractors and subcontractors performing work on 
federal or District of Columbia construction contracts or federally assisted contracts in excess of 
$2,000 to pay their laborers and mechanics no less [than] the prevailing wage rates and fringe 
benefits for corresponding classes of laborers and mechanics employed on similar projects in 
the area” (Dept of Labor, 2006).  The requirement for contractors to pay their employees 
directed wage rates on federal contracts counteracts the establishment of market-determined 
rates.  As a result, not only are labor costs not leveraged, but labor costs under SCA and DBRA 
provisions may actually be higher than those established in a competitive marketplace.  The 
Congressional Budget Office estimated that by repealing the SCA, the federal government could 
reduce the cost of procured services by approximately $600M in 2000 and by about $6.1B from 
2000-2009 (CBO, 1999).  Although the projected savings is difficult to measure, they argue 
repealing the act would promote greater competition among bidders and would allow 
contractors the flexibility to reduce the costs for providing services.  Similarly, the CBO argued 
repealing the DBRA could help reduce costs by about $245M in 2000 and by about $9.6B from 
2000-2009 using a similar rationale (CBO, 1999).  Opponents argue repealing the acts could 
reduce the quality of services provided.  Nevertheless, these laws interfere with competitive 
market forces and their effect on volume leveraging.   
Additionally, contract administration for federal service contracts is labor intensive and 
could be exacerbated if geographically dispersed services were to be consolidated.  In addition 
to location specific surveillances and quality evaluations required throughout the life of the 
contract, contracts under SCA or DBRA provisions often require annual wage determinations to 
address changing prevailing wage rates and benefits.  Policymakers should consider the costs 
and burden of performing these administrative activities on consolidated contracts.  In 2004, the 
Air Force attempted to consolidate gate guard services at 29 installations across the US.  The 
two contracts had over 50 distinct wage determinations.  The magnitude of the task required by 
the contracting office to manage the volume of determinations was burdensome in issuing the 
request for proposal alone, not to mention the administrative costs of addressing the annual 
wage determinations.  While consolidating service contracts could lead to other value-added 
areas such as decreased transaction costs, timeliness, or other process efficiencies, these must 
be weighed against the increased administrative costs and burden.    
Recall Kraljik’s Strategic Sourcing Model wherein he recommended sourcing strategies 
based on the commodity’s profit impact and supply risk.  Leverage items, with their high 
profitability profiles and low supply risk, are the key targets for organizations seeking cost 
reductions.  The DoD purchases a wide variety of commercial services for its installations and 
facilities.  These include groundskeeping, janitorial services, security guard services, and 
information technology and communication services.  These types of services are abundant in 
the market place and would be categorized as having a relatively low supply risk.  However, the 
profitability potential for services is low as geographic dispersion and federal statutes diminish 
the cost reduction potential associated with the leveraged buying of services.  Accordingly, 
perhaps such services should not be considered a leverage item in the DoD.   
The Effect of the “Buy American Act” on Strategic Purchasing 
The Buy American Act is another example of a statutory barrier to successfully 
implementing strategic sourcing.  Congress codified the Act in 1933 with the express purpose of 
restricting the purchase of supplies that are not domestic end-products.  The act seems to be 
rooted in the pre-World War II protectionist policies of the US.  As implemented by FAR Subpart 
25, the provision provides a preferential treatment for unmanufactured articles, manufactured 
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its intent, the Buy American Act prevents the federal government from exercising strategic 
sourcing best practices as demonstrated by industry.  In September 2005, Supply Chain 
Management Review identified five primary strategies that procurement leaders are adopting as 
part of their procurement transformation efforts.  One of these strategies involves organizations 
adopting low-cost-country supply (LCCS) initiatives.  In efforts to reduce supply costs, 
companies are expected to double their spending with offshore suppliers by 2008 (Minihan, 
2005).  Savings can be dramatic with offshore manufacturing prices—as much as 30 to 50 
percent less than those in the United States (Minihan, 2005).  The Buy American Act expressly 
prohibits federal procurement organizations from accessing the same leveraging opportunities 
as industry.  
The Effect of Federal Labor Laws and Small Business Goals on Strategic Purchasing 
Industry’s strategic sourcing successes hinged on leveraging principles which require 
consolidating enterprise-wide volume and concentrating the supply base.  On average, leading 
procurement organizations operate with approximately 50% fewer suppliers and concentrate 
upwards of 80% of their purchasing on approximately 6% of their suppliers.  These practices 
cause alarm amongst small business advocates in the United States.  Table 2 lists the 
contributions of US small businesses as reported by the Small Business Administration. 
Contributions of US Small Businesses 
• provide approximately 75 percent of the net new jobs 
added to the economy.  
• represent 99.7 percent of all employers. 
• employ 50.1 percent of the private work force.  
• provide 40.9 percent of private sales in the country.  
• account for 39.1 percent of jobs in high technology 
sectors in 2001.  
• account for 52 percent of private-sector output in 
1999.  
• represent 97 percent of all US exporters 
Table 2. Small Business Statistics (SBA, 2006) 
The federal government recognizes the importance of small businesses to the economy, 
and actively promotes small business growth through advocacy programs, laws and regulations 
which incorporate small businesses in the federal acquisition process, specific goals for 
agencies in small business concerns, and reserving categories of federal procurements solely 
for small businesses.  In March 2002, the President issued his Small Business Agenda.  Citing 
small business as the backbone of the US economy, the agenda aims at creating an 
environment in which small businesses can flourish.  This paper does not argue the merits of 
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advancements.  Rather, this paper addresses, in part, the dynamics of small business advocacy 
which serve as a barrier to successfully implementing strategic purchasing in the DoD. 
Federal agencies have attempted to leverage buying power by consolidating and 
bundling contracts.  According to Federal Acquisition Regulation, subpart 2.101, contract 
bundling means to consolidate: 
two or more requirements for supplies or services, previously provided or performed 
under separate smaller contracts that were or could have been performed by small 
business, into a solicitation for a single contract that is likely to be unsuitable for award to 
a small business concern due to diversity, size, or specialized nature of the elements of 
performance specified; aggregate dollar value; geographic dispersion of contract 
performance sites; or any combination of these factors.   
Contract consolidation refers to a similar approach with the exception that it pertains to 
all combinations of requirements that were previously performed separately by businesses of 
any size (large or small).  Agencies bundle and consolidate contracts in order to leverage the 
government’s buying power.  The practices agree with strategic sourcing principles practiced by 
industry. 
Unfortunately, the goals of consolidation and bundling are nearly polarized with the goals 
of small business development.  In fact, in 2002, the OMB prepared a strategy for “unbundling” 
federal contracts.  The strategy explicitly states a federal objective of not pursuing operational 
efficiencies at the expense of reducing small business opportunities (OMB, 2002).  They argue 
that bundled contracts have reduced federal contracting opportunities for small businesses and 
that for every $100 awarded on a bundled contract, there is a $33 decrease to small businesses 
(OMB, 2002).  As a result, bundling and consolidation efforts receive considerable opposition.  
The President’s strategy focuses not just on unbundling contracts and avoiding future bundling 
but on actively seeking opportunities for small business awards.  FAR 19.202-1 reinforces this 
small business emphasis by requiring federal contracting officers to divide proposed 
acquisitions of supplies and services into smaller lots (where applicable) in order to permit offers 
on quantities less than the total requirement and to plan acquisitions such that more than one 
small business concern may perform the work.  The requirements to not only scale down 
purchase volume but to expand the number of suppliers and contracts awarded violate 
industry’s strategic sourcing principles. 
Not all public procurement activities yield to the small business rationale. In 2004, state 
procurement officials in Pennsylvania challenged the rationale of emphasizing small business to 
the detriment of operating efficiencies.  While strategically sourcing office supplies, the state 
reduced its supplier base from over 1,800 separate vendors to one central supplier.  The 
decision drew opposition from small business advocates who argued the economical impact of 
reducing small business opportunities.  The state’s general services director stated “purchasing 
didn’t have a mandate from the voters to spend more money and buy more from more vendors. 
We had a mandate to reduce spending” (Patton, 2006).  The state argued their responsibility 
was creating an environment wherein small businesses could flourish—not subsidizing them 
through directed contracts.   
Another area that confuses the issue is the government’s ambiguity in direction provided 
federal agencies in regards to procurement policy.  In a May 2005 OMB memo sent to all 
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agencies to leverage spending to the maximum extent possible using strategic sourcing 
methods.  The direction requires agencies to identify at least three commodities that could be 
purchased more effectively and efficiently and requires agencies to set cost-reduction goals.  
Also, in the same memo Mr. Clay directs agencies to increase achievement of socio-economic 
goals (small business goals) and improve vendor access to business opportunities.  The 
guidance seems conflicting in that pure leveraging through strategic purchasing requires 
consolidating enterprise-wide volume and concentrating the supply base.  How can a 
procurement organization simultaneously concentrate the supply base while increasing small 
business subcontracting goals and improving small business access to business opportunities?  
The new direction creates a paradox for federal buyers.  Any compromise between leveraging 
objectives and small business objectives ultimately reduces the potential benefits of either 
approach. 
No Single Voice in Federal Procurement 
The DoD procurement system supports perhaps the largest and most complex 
organization in the world: operating out of 600,000 facilities at 6,700 locations in 146 countries.  
Out of this system, DoD contracting officers annually award nearly 9.3 million contracts.    
The organization is really more of a conglomeration of individual organizations rather 
than one entity.  The distinctive missions of these individual units mark them as distinct as 
separate companies operating in the commercial marketplace with each unit operating as a 
quasi profit-and-loss center.  Responsibility and accountability for efficient procurement 
execution rests at the unit level.  Thai (2001) described the procurement system as “nested 
structure of systems within systems” with a structure of “centralized procurement within the 
executive branch, and a complicated structure of decentralized procurement within executive 
agencies.”  In order to provide adaptive, flexible and tailored procurement solutions for individual 
units, the system is fragmented and decentralized by design.  As a by-product of this design, 
though, there is no single voice in the DoD responsible for the organization spend, or with the 
ability to dictate and enforce strategic acquisition programs.  Additionally, the fragmented 
purchasing system limits the DoD’s efficiency and effectiveness.   
Leading strategic sourcing experts cite two critical factors necessary to successfully 
implement strategic purchasing.  First, they identify the need for top management to believe fully 
that centralized procurement is the best method to improve procurement effectiveness.  
Secondly, they identify the requirement to put in place a chief procurement officer charged with 
the responsibility and accountability for procurement operations (Richter, 2003; Porter, 2003). 
This individual should have authority over key procurement responsibilities—especially source 
selection and supplier performance decisions.  Without this “single voice” with complete 
visibility, oversight, and profit and loss responsibilities, centralization efforts in the DoD will fail. 
Air Force Commodity Councils rely on collaboration and consensus among team 
members chartered to coordinate on strategic purchases.  Council chairmen lack the authority 
to require participation and enforce procurement policies and sourcing decisions.  For example, 
in the recently established Force Protection Commodity Council, the Director for Air Force 
Security Forces (AF/XOF) and the Air Force’s Deputy Assistant (Contracting) (SAF/AQC) 
shared the responsibilities as the Commodity Sourcing Official and sanctioned the Commander 
of the Air Force’s Security Forces Center (HQ AFSC) to lead the Force Protection Commodity 
Council process (USAF, 2004).  By design, the council senior leadership team (the CSO and 
HQ AFSFC) provided policy support in commodity process execution and program direction, 
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Air Force failed to designate accountability for program success and failed to require enterprise-
wide participation.  In other words, buying organizations were never required to participate in the 
strategic purchasing efforts, and no one was held responsible for results.  The charter tasked 
the major commands (MAJCOMS) to identify representatives to serve as subject-matter experts 
and to survey base-level functional areas for information on current usage and future 
requirements but never required MAJCOMS to centrally purchase commodities.  This voluntary 
aspect of the process undermined the Air Force’s need to consolidate enterprise-wide volume 
and sub-optimized the potential outcome by weakening the organization’s leveraging power. 
One only needs to follow the money trail to identify where the power ultimately rests.  
After Congress appropriates and apportions funding to federal agencies, the services then 
distribute funds through the major commands to individual organizations that then have the 
responsibility for funds obligation and execution.  Procurement responsibility in the DoD resides 
at the unit level. In DoD strategic purchasing scenarios, units voluntarily agree to collaborate in 
the venture, but as the owners of the requirements and the funding, the decision to participate is 
theirs.  Unfortunately, decentralized units are often reluctant to give up control of sourcing 
decisions and want to control everything that touches their business operations (Gerstner, 
2002).  The Councils then rely on the collective teamwork of multiple decentralized 
organizations and hope to achieve successful solutions.  With this structure, it is nearly 
impossible to effectively leverage the organization’s global buying power.  Without a chief 
procurement officer with real power to affect all designated expenditures, strategic purchasing in 
the DoD will only be a titular initiative.  With no single voice responsible for the acquisition 
process, it is incredibly difficult to implement strategic sourcing solutions. 
The absence of a single voice also leads to confusion and ambiguity in regards to DoD 
actions and objectives.  Industry objectives are clear.  Leaders cite strategic purchasing as one 
of the first things a company should do to save money (Porter, 2003).  By taking a corporate 
approach to procurement, they use strategic purchasing practices to optimize price, quality, 
delivery and technology, and they task procurement organizations to achieve demanding cost-
reduction goals.  DoD actions, on the other hand, seem disjointed and ambiguous.  Congress 
and DoD leaders acknowledge the fiscal crisis, and as of 1 October 2005, the OMB requires 
federal agencies use strategic sourcing to lower costs and maximize the value of each dollar 
spent.  The DoD, however, seems to be targeting the wrong areas.  Rather than focusing on 
true leverage items with high returns, the Department’s focus seems directed more on process 
control and transactional analysis in order to improve operating efficiencies.  Some may argue 
dollars saved through improved operations (efficiency funds) could be used to fund other 
initiatives.  Unfortunately, there is no method to budget, plan for and obligate for efficiency 
funds.  Also, as efficiency funds relate to manpower costs, they do little to fund tangible 
requirements for goods and services.  Improving operating efficiencies is a noble effort but only 
a small portion of the problem.  The Department faces not just the problem of doing more with 
less but also getting more for less.  The DoD must do more than reduce its operating costs (a 
transactional process approach)—it must reduce purchasing costs in order to survive the 
current budget shortfall (a strategic approach). Lastly, since quantifying efficiency savings is 
subjective and difficult to measure, procurement organizations may find it hard to “sell” the 
concept to senior leaders.  
Conclusion 
The DoD is struggling to survive a fiscal crisis.  The Department faces rising operating 
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recruitment and retention, healthcare and other “must pay” bills.  Since increasing the budget is 
not an alternative, the Department will have to transform its business processes.  One 
alternative is to reduce the cost of business operations by increasing the efficiency with which 
current funding is used (doing more with less).  Another alternative is to identify more innovative 
ways to operate. This is more than just trying to meet existing requirements more efficiently. 
Rather, it involves meeting existing requirements by operating in very different ways such as 
strategic purchasing (getting more for less).  When faced with flat demand and a competitive 
market, leading organizations used strategic purchasing to drastically reduce purchasing costs.  
In many cases, organizations reduced purchasing costs by as much as 55% annually.  They 
accomplished these savings using the two central tenets of strategic purchasing: 1) 
consolidating enterprise-wide volume, and 2) concentrating the supply base.   
The DoD has barriers to successfully implementing strategic purchasing.  These barriers 
are such that the Department’s potential cost reductions will pale in comparison to those 
achieved by industry.  First, geographically distributed services required by the Department are 
not amenable to leverage principles.  Furthermore, labor laws such as the Service Contract Act 
and the Davis-Bacon Act not only inhibit scale efficiencies but may also add costs.  Secondly, 
the federal government’s emphasis on supporting small businesses requires the DoD to 
abandon the key tenets of strategic purchasing.  Strategic purchasing and small business goals 
are polarized. The DoD can not simultaneously concentrate the supply base while increasing 
small business subcontracting goals and improving small business access to business 
opportunities. Therefore, any DoD procurement process will require a compromise between 
small business goals and cost reduction goals—which ultimately sub-optimizes outcomes for 
each.  Finally, because of its requirement for decentralized operations, the DoD is unable to 
establish a chief procurement officer with the authority to effect all designated expenditures.  
Without that single voice, it will be incredibly difficult for the DoD to successfully implement 
strategic sourcing solutions, and the process will be perceived as titular. 
We recommend the DoD readdress its strategic purchasing program.  First, the DoD 
should reexamine its efforts of centralizing purchases for geographically distributed services.  
These types of commodities should not be considered a leverage item.  They are not amenable 
to scale economies and the SCA and DBRA further inhibit potential cost savings.  While 
commodity councils may achieve some process efficiencies through more timely ordering or by 
eliminating redundancies, the administrative costs may outweigh the benefits.  We recommend 
the DoD target small businesses as prime candidates for providing these types of services.  
With contracted services now accounting for more than half of the DoD’s total annual spend, the 
potential for small business is enormous.     
Second, although pressured by the OMB directive to engage in strategic purchasing, the 
DoD must proceed smartly.  Before executing any strategic purchasing efforts, the Department 
must place a greater emphasis on quantifying potential savings.  By developing cost savings 
models, the DoD can build a case for taking a consolidated approach, justify its actions, and 
allow senior managers to realign resources to more effectively support other mission priorities.  
In some cases, the DoD may find the associated administrative costs of strategic purchasing 
actions may outweigh the potential benefits.  Therefore, efforts to regionalize or centralize 
services procurement should be carefully scrutinized from a cost standpoint.  The DoD faces a 
clear choice: drastically reduce costs, or drastically reduce its mission.  Industry has shown us 
that strategic sourcing is a powerful tool for reducing cost.  But just as a hammer is of little use 
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